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CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

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I welcome this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency, especially its analytical/research arm, and the academic community. Recent events here have again sparked broad discussion of both the propriety and wisdom of university scholars cooperating in any way with American intelligence. On December 3rd of last year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar who works for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar." These are strong words. In my view they are absolutely wrong. Nonetheless, there are real concerns that should be addressed.

My remarks tonight center on two simple propositions:

- First, preserving the liberty of this nation is fundamental to and prerequisite for the preservation of academic freedom; the university community cannot prosper and protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the nation.**
- Second, in defending the nation and our liberties, the Federal Government needs to have recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic community. Tensions inevitably accompany the relationship between defense, intelligence and academe, but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or elimination of such tensions.**

The History of CIA-University Relations

In discussing the relationship between the academic community and American intelligence, and specifically the research and analysis side of intelligence, it is important to go back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded President Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving world events. He proposed that the service "draw on the universities for experts with long foreign experience and specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and created the Office of the Coordinator of Information, later renamed the Office of Special Services, under

Donovan's leadership. The prominent Harvard historian, William L. Langer, was recruited as the Director of Research and he in turn, recruited some of the finest scholars in America for the OSS, many of them from Harvard, Yale and Columbia Universities.

When CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947, this pattern was repeated. Langer returned to establish the Board of National Estimates. Robert Amory of the Harvard Law School faculty was named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1952, and served in that capacity for nearly ten years. Other academicians who joined included: historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck; economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic intelligence effort; economist Richard Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloane Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for the duration of the Korean War before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He is quoted as recalling that he joined the Agency because "Stalin made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for academicians to join the Agency in the early years.

Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and faculty or students rarely questioned the nation's need for the Agency and its activities. Some of the most noted university professors of the time served on a regular basis as unpaid consultants, helping CIA to form its estimates of probable trends in world politics.

These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some criticism on campuses over CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961. But the real deterioration in relations between CIA and the academe paralleled the wrenching divisions in the country over the Vietnam War, despite continuing academic cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence. The decline in CIA-academia ties accelerated with the February 1967 disclosure in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding the foreign activities of the National Student Association for a number of years.

Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA became more frequent in the media in the early 1970s, culminating in the establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives.

Even the Church Committee, however, so critical of other intelligence activities, recognized that CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce." The Committee recommended that academic advice and judgment of academics be openly sought. The Committee concluded that the principal responsibility for setting the terms of the relationship between CIA and academe should rest with college administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of . . . the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members."

This paralleled considerable debate within academic ranks and numerous articles about the relationship between the universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President of the American Association of University Professors, then CIA Director George Bush replied that the Agency sought "only the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually so at the request of the scholars, rather than the Agency, and he refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best scholars in our country."

Adopting this approach, Director Stansfield Turner engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President Bok of Harvard on relations between this university and the Agency. (Ironically, at this time, another Harvard professor, Robert Bowie, was my predecessor as head of the analytical element of the Agency.) Some academic institutions adopted guidelines similar to the restrictive regulations established at Harvard; in most cases less severe guidelines were proposed. In a great majority of schools where the issue arose, however, the faculty and administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the grounds that existing regulations or practices were adequate to protect both the institution and individuals.

The Agency's relations with the academic world have improved in recent years for a variety of reasons, including developments abroad and recognition in the academic community that CIA, together with the Departments of State and Defense, has been an important and useful supporter of area and regional studies and foreign language studies in the United States. The agencies of the American intelligence community as well as the Department of State have long been a primary source of employment for specialists in these

areas. The academic community also consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence community in their successful campaign to win support for a Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.

In some areas of research, such as on the Soviet Union, our cooperation for nearly 40 years has remained both close and constant. This also has been the case often in the fields of economics and physical sciences. On the other hand, there have been much more pronounced ups and downs in our relationships with political scientists and allied social sciences, particularly among those with expertise in the Third World.

Why CIA Needs Academe

There is, however, one constant in the history of this relationship and in its future as well: our need for your help, and the opportunity you have to contribute to a better informed policymaking process by cooperating with us. Let me describe how and why.

In just the last dozen years, we have been confronted with a large number of new issues and developments and also have had to pay attention to problems too long neglected. The oil embargo of 1973, the subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices and now their plunge; the related dramatic changes in the international economic system, the growth of debt in Third World countries and now repayment problems; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final passage of European colonialism from Africa; new Soviet beachheads and surrogates in the Third World; changing patterns in international trade; and the growth of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and terrorism all have demonstrated vividly that our national security is greatly affected by developments and events in addition to the number and capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.

Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering in their diversity. They include problems such as the implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World countries; problems of political, economic and social instability and how to forecast them; human rights; narcotics; the illicit arms market; the implications of immigration flows in various regions of the world; population trends and their political and security implications; the global food supply; water resources; energy; technology transfer; terrorism; proliferation of chemical/biological and nuclear weapons; changing commodity markets and their implications for Third World countries; and others too numerous to recount.

But nearly all of these problems have something in common: while CIA has experts in virtually all subjects of concern, there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the community of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the American government, better understand these problems and their implications for us and for international stability.

With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the Directorate of Intelligence several years ago initiated an intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think tanks of every stripe, and the business community for information, analysis and advice.

- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of concern to us and to encourage participation of our analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300 conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable participation by the academic community and touching on many of the issues I noted. In addition, we have recorded more than 1500 instances of our analysts attending conferences sponsored by the private sector—and doing so as openly acknowledged CIA employees.**
- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to test our assessments in ways consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have helped scholars get security clearances so that they could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists outside the government—in the academic community and various think tanks, and by retired senior military officers, independent specialists, and others.**
- We have established panels of security cleared specialists from business and the academic community to meet with us regularly not only to help improve specific research papers but to help develop new research methods, review performance, and help us test new approaches and hypotheses.**
- Our analysts are required to refresh their own substantive credentials and expand their horizons by obtaining outside training at least every two years. This requirement can be met through taking university courses, participating in business**

or other outside sponsored seminars and conferences, attending military training courses, and so forth.

Our involvement with the academic community takes several forms:

- *Consulting*: This is the most prevalent. It can be formal, under a contractual arrangement in which the individual is paid a set government rate, or it can be informal and unpaid—an exchange of views between interested specialists. We are particularly interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or orthodoxy. We know what we think, but we need to know what others think also.
- *Sponsorship of conferences*: We generally organize our own, but occasionally we contract with others to organize a conference for us. And, of course, our analysts attend conferences sponsored by business, academic and professional organizations, think tanks, and universities.
- *Research*: In some areas, scholars in universities have the experience and expertise to carry out basic research for us, for example, on demographic and economic subjects. The recent controversy at Harvard and the media have focused on this area of cooperation. In fact, it presently is a very minor element in our overall relationship with the academic community. It is hardly a program, as recently alleged, of "covert fees and fellowships" with which we can "buy scholastic priorities."
- *Scholars in Residence*: We have had a scholars-in-residence program for a number of years under which individuals from the academic world can spend a year or two working with us, with full security clearances, on topics of interest to them and us.
- *Information*: Finally, we are interested in talking with scholars who are willing to share with us their impressions after traveling to places of interest or participating in events of interest abroad.

A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range of issues with which we must cope requires not only

dogged research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not famous for their encouragement of these characteristics—although there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to rely solely on information funneled through government channels inevitably would constrict the range of views and information needed. We are looking for people to challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and to go back to the drawing board when we have missed something important. In short, we don't want scholars to tell us what they think we want to hear. That would make our entire effort pointless.

Finally, this relationship is not necessarily a one-way street. Just as we are conscious of our need for the injection of ideas and information from outside government channels, I believe you should concede that there is at least the possibility that you might learn something from discussions with us.

Your Concerns

Let me now address some of the major concerns that have been raised by scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with us. I would note that certain of these concerns reach well beyond just CIA and involve the entire question of relations between outside sources of funds and the university community.

1. *Doesn't research or analysis under CIA auspices of events abroad inevitably compromise academic freedom and the honesty of academic research?*

— First of all, when we contract for research, we insist on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook the books and we would never consult or contract with a scholar a second time who did that. Our research and analysis must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the executive branch, the oversight committees of the Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and a variety of other panels and organizations that have access to our information. While we acknowledge we can be and have been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on our reputation for integrity and for reliable and objective assessments. Any research we use should have the same qualities.

— Second, it seems to me that academic freedom depends on a scholar not being beholden to any outside influence or rigid ideological conceptions but only to the pursuit of truth. The scholar should be free to search where he or she wishes and should not be constrained by any improper influences, including the preferences of colleagues or prevailing cultural winds. Actually, improper influence potentially can be exerted on a scholar in a number of ways: funding from contracts and consultantships with business, foundations and foreign governments—or even the threat of withholding tenure. American academics have long consulted with officials of foreign governments of all stripes. In light of this, singling out a US government agency as a particular threat to honest inquiry represents a double standard if not outright hypocrisy. If a university requires public exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely logic and equity require a similar practice for relationships with foreign governments and, in fact, all other outside relationships. And, indeed, if our funding should be openly acknowledged, should not all outside funding, of whatever source, be openly acknowledged? You are rightly proud of your ability to do objective research. CIA does not threaten it.

— Third, I agree with the proposition that it is the responsibility of the university itself to establish and monitor the rules governing all these relationships. It is both foolish and irresponsible to do so by isolating the scholar from any outside contact under the guise of protecting academic freedom.

2. *Won't publicly acknowledged contacts with CIA hinder a scholar's access and freedom of inquiry overseas?* I acknowledge this might be a problem for some individuals. Indeed, in some places around the world, all Americans are suspected of working for CIA. However, many who have worked with us for years have not had any difficulty.
3. *Can't a colleague's contacts even with CIA analysts compromise an entire department?* I have been asked before about the danger of one scholar's association with us involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of guilt by association. I would simply offer two observations. First, the university community is a remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments there are scholars who are involved in some sort of activity with which their colleagues disagree or which they

do not support. So, again, this problem is not limited just to CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on such relationships that could be kept confidential would seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My second observation, however, is that at some point some courage is called for. The freedom of those who do wish to consult with us can be infringed upon by the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe that working with your government to help bring about better informed policy is shameful; indeed, it should be a source of pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a better understanding of some of the most difficult and occasionally dangerous problems of the world, in my view, is responsive to the scholar's highest calling.

4. *Isn't prepublication review tantamount to CIA censorship of independent ideas, opinions and judgments?* No. Our review is only to ensure that no classified information is included in a book or article and that the text does not reveal intelligence sources and methods. We have no interest in altering the substance or conclusions of writings we review and take great care to avoid asking for such changes. And the fact is: we don't. Where a consultant has no access to classified information, there is no prepublication review.
5. *What about the view that CIA engages in covert action as well as collection and analysis and a variety of "immoral" acts and therefore association with any part of CIA is unacceptable?* Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the approval of appropriate authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They are activities mandated by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches. As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds for legal intelligence activities with which they disagree, thereby terminating such activities.

— The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy instrument of the elected representatives of the American people, just like the military, USIA or the Department of State. If you find some element of the government's foreign policy or activity inconsistent with your professional judgment, I would encourage you first to do all you can to test the validity of your position. You also can decline to have any association with us at all. But in the latter case, the decision whether to associate with us should be left to the individual. One

individual's freedom of association should not be denied because of another's personal point of view. A university steps on precarious ground and itself endangers academic freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with—and, I would add, especially if one of those organizations is a branch of our society's own democratically chosen government.

Our Rules

Before I close, let me review the rules and policies of the analytical arm of CIA for dealing with the university community. We continually review our regulations and policies in the light of new opportunities, new problems and new issues. For example, well before the recent controversy here at Harvard, we revised our contract language with respect to prepublication review, narrowing that review—which again, is simply to avoid the compromise of classified information—to the specific subject area in which a scholar had access to classified information. For example, if a scholar consults with us about nuclear proliferation and has access to classified information, writings on unrelated subjects need not be submitted.

We have again looked at our rules and policies as a result of the controversy here at Harvard, and this too has produced some modifications. For example, the Directorate of Intelligence now explicitly tells any organization or individual organizing a conference on our behalf that the participants in the conference should be informed in advance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly, because we organize the overwhelming majority of our conferences ourselves, this problem had not arisen before.

Let me review three key policies of particular interest to the university community:

- First, while the Directorate of Intelligence presently has no contracts for classified research at any academic institution, we can and will let contracts for classified research where university rules permit, where appropriate facilities and circumstances allow, and when a genuine need exists.**
- Second, when we contract for unclassified research, we spell out explicitly for the scholar the conditions governing use of that research. In some cases, the research will be done strictly for us, and we will be the only recipient. In other cases, once**

we have received the research and assured ourselves that the terms of the contract have been carried out, we will acquiesce in a scholar's request to publish a book or article drawing on that research. We do not commission or contract for books or articles. We are realistic about pressures on scholars to publish, however, and, in order to attract some of the best people to work with us, we try to accommodate their desire to draw on unclassified research they have done for us for publication for their own purposes. And, finally, there are cases where we allow research done for us later to be published under the scholar's name without any prepublication review on our part.

But in any of these circumstances, our review is simply to ensure that the work we contracted to be done has been done, meets appropriate standards of quality and does not contain classified information. Taxpayers justifiably would be displeased if we were not to ensure that we had received true value for their money.

- Third, we also have looked again at the question of whether our funding of research that is subsequently used in a publication by a scholar should be openly acknowledged. There are several good reasons that argue against such an approach, including the possibility of difficulty with a foreign government by virtue of acknowledged CIA interest in its internal affairs; the possibility that acknowledged CIA interest in a specific subject—such as the financial stability of a particular country—could affect the situation itself; and, finally, concern that readers might assume the scholar's conclusions were, in fact, CIA's.

As a result of the controversy here at Harvard and expressions of concern about this policy, we reexamined this issue with considerable care. In the first place, there are certain circumstances under which disclosure of our funding of research may be required, and we of course comply. Beyond this, we have decided that our interest in obtaining the cooperation of this country's scholars and allaying the misunderstandings and suspicions that have grown out of our earlier approach warrants at least some change in our policy. Accordingly, CIA will henceforth permit acknowledgment of our funding of research that is later independently published by a scholar unless (1) the scholar requests privacy or (2) we determine that formal, public association of CIA with a specific topic or subject would prove damaging to the United States. Any acknowledgement of CIA funding would be accompanied by a statement

to the effect that the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIA or of the US government. I assume, of course, that universities also will press hard for public disclosure of other sources of funding for research.

— Fourth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or her home institution in terms of reporting the relationship with us. But, in our view, it is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the institution to set such rules and to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to comply.

Conclusions

The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the security and well being of the American people are increasingly diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees believe that contacts with universities and others in the private sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and warning the government about developments around the world—the same mission identified by General Donovan and President Roosevelt. Our ability to carry out our mission, as in the days of Langer and Donovan, depends on voluntary cooperation between those of us who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and those in the university, business, retired military, and others who can help us understand these challenges better and forecast them more accurately. Our country is the ultimate beneficiary.

Consultation and cooperation with CIA on the problems this nation faces abroad do not threaten academic freedom. However, I believe that freedom of inquiry is limited, a desire to render public service sometimes tragically thwarted, and our nation disadvantaged, by those who would deny a scholar's willingness to work with the American intelligence service in assessing the world around us.

The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense, Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be prevented by academic institutions or colleagues from doing so. And none should have to worry that his or her reputation will suffer because of a public-spirited, patriotic willingness to help us better understand and forecast developments abroad affecting our national well-being and the forces that threaten our freedom.